José Manuel Mansilla-Fernández

This journal section indicates a few and briefly commented references that a non-expert reader may want to cover to obtain a first informed and broad view of the theme discussed in the current issue. These references are meant to provide an extensive, though not exhaustive, insight into the main topics of the debate. More detailed and specific references are available in each article published in the current issue.

On the relevance of climate change risks

Understanding the effects of climate change on the financial system has emerged as one of the forefront issues globally (Hong et al., 2019, 2020). Climate change is believed to increase the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, raise average temperatures, and rising sea levels. Importantly, climate change already impacts economic and financial outcomes, which might have negative repercussions on financial systems. Correlated risks from climate change shocks could have effects beyond individual banks and borrowers to the broader financial system and economy. In this regard, in the pricing of residential mortgages does not incorporate climate change risks, a sudden correction could result in large-scale losses to banks, leading to reduced lending supply and jeopardizing financial stability. The subsequent declines in wealth could amplify the effects of climate change on the real economy, thus producing knock-on effects on financial markets (Nguyen et al., 2021).

Financial institutions must assess their vulnerabilities to relevant climate risks, as well as risks’ likely persistent and breadth, to be able to continue meeting the financial needs of households and companies when hit by disruptions caused by climate change. Remarkably, considering climate risks is relevant from the regulatory point of view. In this vein, the Federal Reserve created a dedicated supervision climate committee to observe the risks of climate change to individual banks. Likewise, the Bank of England expects its banks to understand and assess the financial risks related to climate change (Nguyen et al., 2021).

The recent studies are focused on exploring the ex-post effects of acute hazards, e.g., storms, floods, wildfires, on banks. In this regard, North and Schüwer (2018) show that natural disasters weaken financial stability. Similarly, Issler et al. (2020) find an augment in mortgage delinquency and foreclosure after wildfires. Ouazad and Kahn (2021) find that lenders are more likely to approve mortgages that can be securitized after hurricanes. Unlike acute hazards, the chronic ones -e.g., slow increases in sea levels- introduce the possibility that losses may arise from natural disasters. Despite the risk of chronic hazards causing losses, economists still know little about how such risks are priced ex-ante by banks. Consequently, more research is needed to understand how climate risk can be priced -ante by financial institutions, particularly the pricing of loans.

Interestingly, banks may not be able to price long-term climate change risks. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2020a, b) estates that banks’ models still lack the necessary geographic precision or horizons to price climate risks. Another challenge can be uncertainty regarding the time horizon over climate risk can be materialized (Barnett et al., 2020). Furthermore, many banks still rely on traditional backward-looking models based on historical exposures, which might not adequately reflect climate risks’ complex and continuous changing nature. Moreover, considering the set of risks that banks are currently facing -e.g., cybersecurity, geopolitical risks, and risks associated with the credit cycle-along with the relative long-term horizon around climate change and risk (Nyberg and Wright, 2015). For instance, sea levels rise is a non-conventional risk and therefore, lenders pay equal attention to this risk or incorporate it into their pricing loan decisions (Jiang et al., 2020).

On carbon pricing and its repercussions on lending

Research on carbon risk is still embryonic. Stranded assets are physical assets whose value declines substantially due to climate risk. The carbon reduction requirements in the Paris Agreement and the policies oriented to fossil fuel firms might not be able to fully utilize their existing fossil fuel reserves (McGlade and Ekins, 2015), leading to a decline in the financial values of such reserves. The carbon risk from stranded assets in the fossil fuel industry can be priced, which constitutes an approach for assessing climate-related financial risks. However, carbon risk goes beyond stranded assets. Firms issuing large volumes of carbon are relatively more likely to suffer financial penalties if environmental policies tighten. Direct penalties can result from additional costs of carbon taxes on firms’ emissions. These can apply to firms in all industries with a carbon footprint and are not limited to fossil fuels producers (Ehlers et al., 2021).

The pricing of carbon risk in the loan markets changed significantly after the Paris Agreement.^[1]See the Institutions section in this issue. The difference in risk premia due to carbon emission intensity is apparently across industry sectors. Additionally, this phenomenon is broader than simply stranded assets in fossil fuel emissions or other carbon-intensive industries. Including loans fees and the premium is not prevalent in the years before the Paris Agreement, which increased banks’ awareness of carbon risk (Krueger et al., 2020). However, Delis et al. (2021) assess syndicated loan data for fossil fuel firms to investigate whether banks price the risk of stranded assets.^[2]The corporate loan market, and specially the syndicated loans markets, constitutes an ideal laboratory to test hypotheses about the effects of climate change / risk on loan pricing, because banks … Continue reading They reveal that only after the 2015 Paris Agreement banks started pricing the risk of stranded assets related to fossil fuel reserves. Similarly, Kleimeier and Viehs (2018) also use syndicated loans data to investigate if forms voluntarily disclose their carbon emissions to the Carbon Disclosure Project, which allows them to reduce their cost of credit compared to non-disclosing firms. This result supportcs Antoniou et al. (2020), who theoretically find that loans spreads for firms participating in cap-and-trade programs function the cost of compliance and the specific features of the permits markets. Using the EU Emission Trading System, which is designed to pass the cost of CO2 emissions to polluters, this study suggests that the higher permits storage and lower permit prices, the lower firm financing costs.

Importantly, banks have started to internalize possible risks from the transition to a low-carbon economy across various industries. Krueger et al. (2020) suggest that carbon emissions indirectly caused by production inputs were not priced at the margin, suggesting that the overall carbon footprint is less of a concern to banks those direct missions. Likewise, Bolton and Kacperczyk (2021) find that the likelihood of disinvestment by institutional investors significantly augments with the degree and intensity of emissions directly attributable to firms. This suggests potential for ‘green-washing’ since the aforementioned emissions mentioned above can be reduced simply by outsourcing carbon-intensive activities withoutlowering the firm’s carbon footprint (Ben-David et al., 2018).

On the impact of climate change on equity markets

So far, research on the pricing of climate change risk, including carbon risk, has focused on the pricing of climate-related risks in equity markets. Recently, economists indicated that a transition risk premium in equity and option markets, which seems to be more pronounced in times of high climate change awareness. Mainly, the price of protection of option securities against the downside tail risk is higher for carbon-intense firms. In this regard, Bolton and Kacperczyk (2021) identify a carbon premium in the cross-section of the US stock market over the last decade. Particularly, the 2016 US climate policy shocks (the Trump election who appointed Scott Pruit, a climate sceptic, as administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency) provide additional evidence that firms’ exposure impacts on their stock market valuation (Ramelli et al., 2021). Consequently, the valuation of carbon-intense firms rose. Goergen et al., (2020) assess carbon risk measures based on the firm’s overall strategy and its operational exposure to transition risk, including carbon emissions. Although they find that carbon risk is a priced risk factor, it does not find any evidence for a carbon premium in the global equity market.

On the capacity of banks to boost the climate change

As major providers of credit, banks are the key players in the effort to transition from a brown to a green economy. The momentum established by the COP21 enlarges the set of investment opportunities to finance green projects and renewable energy. Indeed, investment in the green economy has recently increased and is expected to grow enormously in market share (IEA, 2015; International Renewable Energy Agency, 2016). This increase is motivated by a growing consensus that supports movements towards a low-carbon economy and technological improvements that will lead to cost reductions in renewable energy, making alternatives to fossil fuel more appealing (Mazzucati and Perez, 2015; Krueger et al., 2015).

This might raise the question of how climate risks might directly impact financial institutions. Importantly, banks take on new risks in this regard, particularly physical and transition risks. On the one hand, physical risks arise from weather and climate-related disasters (Nordhaus, 1977; Stern, 2008; Nordhaus, 2019). These events can damage properties, reduce agricultural productivity, and impact deleteriously on human assets (Deryugina and Hsiang, 2014; O’Neil et al., 2017). Should this reduce the firms’ profitability and deteriorate their balance sheets, banks would be negatively affected in terms of asset values, collateral quality, and credit risk exposure. Furthermore, banks suffering large losses could diminish their lending availability, thus exacerbating the financial impact of physical risks by reducing credit supply. The blossoming literature provides theoretical and empirical evidence that banks should consider such physical risks in their investment decisions. Accordingly, Addoum et al. (2019) and Pankratz et al. (2019) show a negative correlation between firms exposed to extreme temperatures and profitability. Balvers et al. (2017) find that firms suffering from relatively high temperatures have higher cost of capital. This result connects with the literature advocating that extreme weather events are incorporated to stock and option markets (Dell et al., 2014; Kruttli etal., 2019; Choi et al., 2020).

On the other hand, banks should face transition risks that might arise from adjustments made toward developing a green economy. Particularly, transition risk depends on the timing and the speed of the process. Unanticipated changes in climate polices, regulations, technologies, and market sentiment could reprice the value of bank assets (CISL, 2019; Hong et al., 2019). Consequently, banks exposed to climate-sensitive sectors might be forced to fire carbon-intensive assets, leading to liquidity problems (Pereira da Silva, 2019). Therefore, this could create uncertainty and procyclicality and increase banks’ market risk (BoE, 2018). Transition risks could impact on bank credit risk if new technologies or changes in consumer behaviour towards “environmentally friendly” sectors lowered carbon-intensive firms’ profitability, further increasing their default risk (Krueger et al., 2020). Reghezza et al. (2021) analyse whether climate-oriented regulatory policies impact the flow of credit towards polluting corporations. Following the Paris Agreement, they find that European banks reallocated credit away from polluting companies. Consequently, green regulatory initiatives in banking can significantly impact on combating climate change.

Importantly, the COP21 is expected to impact the banking sector’s decisions. De Greiff et al. (2018) and Degryse et al. (2020a, b) assess the effect of climate risks on pricing in the syndicated loans. Since the COP21, banks have charged a premium for climate risk driven by increased awareness of climate policy-related risks. In particular, green firms have borrowed at comparatively lower prices since COP21 came into force.
Likewise, Delis et al. (2018) analysed the risk stemming from stranded fossil reserves, suggesting that, after 2015, banks started to price climate policy exposure by raising the cost of credit due to their awareness of transition risk. Ilhan et al. (2018), using a sample of high-emission industries in the S&P 500 before and after COP21, find that investors already incorporate information on climate-related risks when assessing risk profiles. Ginglinger and Moreau (2020) show that, after COP21, French companies subject to large climate risks reduced their leverage.

Regarding the financial system structure, De Haas and Popov (2019) find evidence of relatively lower CO2 emissions in more equity-funded economies, and they argue that stock markets contribute to reallocating investments toward less polluting industries. Similarly, Mesonnier (2019) investigates whether French banks reallocate credit from low intensive industries over the 2010-2017 period. They find that French banks reduce credit provision to more polluting industries.

References

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Antoniou, F., and Kyriakopoulou, E. (2019). On The Strategic Effect of International Permits Trading on Local Pollution. Environmental and Resource Economics, 74: 1299-1329.

Barnett, M., Brock, W., and Hansen, L. P. (2020). Pricing uncertainty induced by climate change. Review of Financial Studies, 33: 1024-1066.

Ben-David, I., Franzoni, F., and Moussawi, R. (2018). Do ETFs Increase Volatility? Journal of Finance, 73: 2471-2535.

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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System’s Financial Stability Report, November (2020b). See: https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20201109.pdf (Accessed on February 2, 2022).

BoE (2018). Transition in thinking: The impact of climate change on the UK banking sector. Bank of England Report, September 2018.

Bolton, P., and Kacperczyk, M.T. (2020). Do investors care about carbon risk? Journal of Financial Economics, 142: 517-549.

Choi, D., Gao, Z., and Jiang, W. (2020). Attention to global warming. The Review of Financial Studies, 33: 1112-1145.

CISL (2019). Unhedgeable risk: How climate change sentiment impacts investment. Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, Cambridge.

De Greiff, K., Ehlers, T. and Packer, F. (2018). The pricing and term structure of environmental risk in syndicated loans. Mimeo, Bank for International Settlements.

De Haas, R. and Popov, A. (2019). Finance and Carbon Emissions. ECB Working Paper Series, No 2318. Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2318~44719344e8.en.pdf (Accessed on February 2, 2022).

Degryse, H., Goncharenko, R., Theunisz, C. and Vadasz, T. (2020). When green meets green. Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=16536

Degryse, H., Roukny, T. and Tielens, J. (2020), Banking barriers to the green economy. NBB Working Papers, No 391. Available at: https://www.nbb.be/en/articles/banking-barriers-green-economy (Accessed on February 2, 2022).

Delis, D. de Greiff, K., Iosifidi, M., and Ongena, S. (2021). Being Stranded with Fossil Fuel Reserves? Climate Policy Risk and the Pricing of Bank Loans. Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 18-10. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3125017

Delis, M., De Greiff, K., and Ongena, S. (2018). Being stranded on the carbon bubble? Climate policy risk and the pricing of bank loans. Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, No 18-10, Swiss Finance Institute. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3125017

Dell, M., Jones, F. B., and Olken, B. (2014). What do we learn from the weather? The new climate-economy literature. Journal of Economic Perspective, 52: 740-798.

Deryugina, T., and Hsiang, M. S. (2014). Does the environment still matter? Daily temperature and income in the United States. NBER Working Papers, No 20750, National Bureau of Economic Research, December. DOI 10.3386/w20750

Ehlers, T., Packer, F., and Greiff, K. (2021). The pricing of carbon risk in syndicated loans: which risks are priced and why? BIS Working Papers No 946. Available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/work946.pdf (Accessed on February 2, 2022).

Ginglinger, D., and Moreau, Q. (2019). Climate risk and capital structure. Mimeo.

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Hong, H., Karolyi, G. A., and Scheinkman, J. A. (2020). Climate finance. Review of Financial Studies, 33: 1011-1023.

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Issler, P., Stanton, R., Vergara-Alert, C., and Wallace, N. (2020). Mortgage Markets with Climate-Change Risk: Evidence from Wildfires in California, Working paper. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3511843

Jiang, F., Li, C. W., and Qian, Y. (2020). Do costs of corporate loans rise with sea level? Working paper. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3477450

Kleimeier, S., and Viehs, M. (2018). Carbon Disclosure, Emission Levels, and the Cost of Debt. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2719665

Krueger, P., Sautner, Z., and Starks, L.T. (2020) The Importance of Climate Risks for Institutional Investors. The Review of Financial Studies, 33: 1067–1111.

Kruttli, S. M., Tran, R. B., and Watugala, W. S. (2019). Pricing Poseidon: Extreme weather uncertainty and firm return dynamics. Finance and Economics Discussion Series, No 2019-054, Board of the Federal Reserve System.

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Recent international commitments to climate change

The United Nations (UN hereafter) Climate Change Conference (COP26), which was held in Glasgow (UK), brought together many of the world’s leaders to address concerning issues related to climate change. The headline decision of COP 26 was the Glasgow Climate Pact, an initiative of the UK COP Presidency to capture progress beyond the formal agenda. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released a report in 2018 that identified that global emissions would need to reduce to zero level by at least 2050 to retain a ‘high-confidence’ level to limit the rise of temperatures to sustainable levels (Masson-Delmotte et al., 2018). The US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen stated that “rising to this challenge will require the wholesale transformation of our carbon-intensive economies” and that “addressing climate change is the greatest economic opportunity of our time.” (COP26, 2021; Depledge et al., 2022).^[1]The World Economic Forum and PwC released jointly the Harnessing Technology for the Global Goals report that identified the significant role that digital technology can play in improving resilience … Continue reading

On the heels of the COP26 Finance Day, the banking industry leaders also met in Glasgow to discuss the leadership role of the banking sector toward net-zero emissions.UN-convened Net-Zero Banking Alliance also committed to coordinating climate actions for financial institutions and aligning their lending and investments portfolios with zero-net emissions by 2050. At the time of writing this note, the Alliance brings together around 100 banks worldwide, representing over 40% of global banking assets. The Alliance acknowledges the crucial role of banks in supporting the transition of the real sector to a greener economy (see Beyene et al., this issue).

The European Commission’s sustainable finance strategy

The High-Level Expert Group on sustainable finance was created in 2016 and included members from the civil society, the financial sector, and the Academia from international institutions.^[2]The European Commission defines sustainable finance as the process of dully taking environmental and social contemplations into account when making long-term decisions in sustainable activities … Continue reading Notably, the 2018 group’s final report established the pillars for the Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth, which is intended to develop the European Union’s sustainable finance strategy and to incorporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations into the European financial system (European Commission, 2019, González-Martínez, 2021). The Taxonomy Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of June 2020) is the cornerstone of the whole Action Plan since it establishes the classification system for the ‘sustainable’ economic activities.^[3]See also Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 and Regulation (EU) 2019/2089.^[4]In this regard, the European Commission introduced two supplements. First, the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2139 supplements Regulation 2020/852 by establishing the technical screening … Continue reading Interestingly, the EU Ecolabel for retail financial products is dedicated to expressing investors’ preferences regarding sustainability and the more straightforward access to sustainable products.

Disclosures

The Financial Stability Board created the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), which provides recommendations for assessing and reporting their climate-related strategy.^[5]Disclosures of the financial impacts of climate-related and environmental risks are crucial for achieving the transparency necessary to preserve market discipline. In other words, promoting peer … Continue reading In particular, the final report makes sector-specific recommendations on how companies should disclose climate-related financial risks to inform better their investors, lenders, and insurers (Campiglio, 2016; Campiglio et al., 2018). Notably, the PCAF Global Greenhouse Gas Accounting and reporting Standard for the Financial industry offers detailed statistics on measures and disclose emissions for specific assets. The Science Based Target initiative (SBTi) published the Financial Sector Science-Based Targets Guidance which enables companies to set emissions reductions targets according to the foremost climate science (SBTi, 2021).

The European Commission adopted in April 2021 a proposal for Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) that introduces stricter reporting requirements and widens the scope of applicability with respect to the existing non-financial reporting directive (NFRD). Furthermore, Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 will apply from March 2021. Regarding the development of a European Union Green Bond Standard, in early July 2021 the European Commission presented its proposal based on a voluntary framework that remarks transparency, the need for external review, and the European Securities and Markets Authority should supervise it.

Remarkably, integrating ESG risks into the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) performed under the Pillar 2 as not exempt from difficulties. However, the EC has considered these recommendations in developing the EU Banking Package that finalises the implementation of Basel III in Europe. Formally, Pillar 3 disclosure requirements are expanded from applying to large, listed institutions to all in the scope of the CRR (EBA, 2021; Marullo Reedtz, this issue). Importantly, as a part of the Pillar 3 disclosure and the NFRD, the Green Asset Ratio measures the “greenness” of the bank’s balance sheet, and it will allow investors and regulators to evaluate and foster new legislation toward green finance. Recently, in January 2022 the European Banking Authority (EBA) released the final draft of the Implementing Technical Standards (ITS) on Pillar 3 disclosures on ESG risks (Mikkelsen et al., this issue).

The role of central banks

Globally, the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) in December 2017 was aimed at defining and promoting good practices, conducting analysis, fomenting climate risk management in the financial sector, and mobilising funds needed for a transition towards a sustainable economy (NGFS, 2021). In Europe, the national central banks incorporate climate-related questions intro their actions. Furthermore, central banks not belonging to the Eurosystem are even introducing environmental questions into their design of the monetary policy. Central banks have begun integrating sustainable and responsible investment (SRI) principles into their portfolio management (NGFS, 2019, 2020). Outstandingly, the European Central Bank is progressing in evaluating and limiting the potential aftermaths of climate change (ECB, 2021a,b; Reghezza et al., 2021).The European Central Banks is advancing on preparing and executing the ECB Thematic Review on Climate-Related and Environmental (C&E) Risks and the ECB Climate Stress tests that include transition and physical risks in a horizon of 30 years. Accordingly, the SSM included climate-related risks in its 2019 and 2020 roadmaps that draw up supervisory expectations for relevant banks (Alonso and Marqués, 2019; Gonzalez and Núñez, 2020, 2021).

References

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Beyene, W., Delis, M., and Ongena, S. (2021). Disclosure of banks fossil exposures. European Economy – Banks, Regulation and the real Sector, this issue.

Campiglio, E. (2016). Beyond carbon pricing: The role of banking and monetary policies in financing the transition to a low-carbon economy, Ecological Economics 121, 220-230. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.03.020

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Depledge, J., Saldivia, M., and Peñasco, C. (2022). Glass half full or glass half empty?: The 2021 Glasgow Climate Conference, Climate Policy, 22, 147-157, DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2022.2038482

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European Central Bank (2021a). Climate-related risk and financial stability. ECB/ESRB Project Team on climate risk monitoring. Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.climateriskfinancialstability202107~87822fae81.en.pdf (Accessed on April 18, 2022).

European Central Bank (2021b). Detailed roadmap of climate change-related actions. Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2021/html/ecb.pr210708_1_annex~f84ab35968.en.pdf (Accessed on April 18, 2022).

European Commission (2019). Guidelines on reporting climate-related information. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/finance/docs/policy/190618-climate-related-information-reporting-guidelines_en.pdf (Accessed on April 18, 2022).

González-Martínez, C.I. (2021). Overview of global and European institutional sustainable finance initiatives. Bank of Spain. Available at: https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/InformesBoletinesRevistas/ArticulosAnaliticos/21/T3/Files/be2103-art30e.pdf (Accessed on April 18, 2022).

González, C. I., and S. Núñez (2020). Cambio climático y sistema financiero: una necesaria mirada al futuro. Papeles de Economía Española No 163, pp. 130-145. Available at: https://www.funcas.es/articulos/cambio-climatico-y-sistema-financiero-una-necesaria-mirada-al-futuro-transicion-hacia-una-economia-baja-en-carbono-en-espana-2019-n-163/ (Accessed on April 18, 2022).

González, C. I., and S. Núñez (2021). Markets, financial institutions and central banks in the face of climate change: challenges and opportunities. Occasional Paper No. 2126. Bank of Spain. Available at: https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesSeriadas/DocumentosOcasionales/21/Files/do2126e.pdf (Accessed on April 18, 2022).

Marullo Reedtz, P. (2021). Financing the environmental transition in Europe. European Economy – Banks, Regulation and the real Sector, this issue.

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Mikkelsen, D., Viscardi, S., Montes, M., and De Amicis, F.P. (2021). Climate change regulation and supervision in Europe and implications for commercial banks. European Economy – Banks, Regulation and the real Sector, this issue.

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NGFS (2021). Annual Report 2020, April.

Reghezza, A., Altunbas, Y., Marques-Ibañez, D., Rodriguez d’Acri, C., and Spaggiari, M. (2021). Do banks fuel climate change? ECB Working Paper Series No. 2550. Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2550~24c25d5791.en.pdf (Accessed on April 18, 2022).

Science-Based Targets initiative (SBTi). 2021. Financial Sector Science-Based Targets Guidance Pilot Version 1.1, Science-Based Targets initiative (SBTi), Report. Available at: https://sciencebasedtargets.org/resources/files/Financial-Sector-Science-Based-Targets-Guidance-Pilot-Version.pdf (Accessed on April 18, 2022).

World Economic Forum & PwC (2021), Harnessing Technology for the Global Goals: A framework for government action, Accessed on 31st October 2021. Accessed at: https://assets.2030vision.com/files/resources/wef-harnessing-technology-for-the-global-goals-2021.pdf?470b76352b (Accessed on April 18, 2022).

Legislation cited

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2139 of 4 June 2021 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council by establishing the technical screening criteria for determining the conditions under which an economic activity qualifies as contributing substantially to climate change mitigation or climate change adaptation and for determining whether that economic activity causes no significant harm to any of the other environmental objectives. Available at: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2021/2139/oj (Accessed on April 18, 2022).

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2178 of 6 July 2021 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council by specifying the content and presentation of information to be disclosed by undertakings subject to Articles 19a or 29a of Directive 2013/34/EU concerning environmentally sustainable economic activities, and specifying the methodology to comply with that disclosure obligation. Available at: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2021/2178/oj (Accessed on April 18, 2022).

Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups Text. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/95/oj (Accessed on April 18, 2022).

European Commission (2019). Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on non-financial reporting: Supplement on reporting climate-related information (2019/C 209/01). Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52019XC0620%2801%29 (Accessed on April 18, 2022).

European Commission (2018). Communication from the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, The European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions. Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth (COM/2018/097 final). Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018DC0097 (Accessed on April 18, 2022).

Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 (Text with EEA relevance) Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/852/oj (Accessed on April 18, 2022).

Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on sustainability‐related disclosures in the financial services sector (PE/87/2019/REV/1). Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/2088/oj (Accessed on April 18, 2022).

Regulation (EU) 2019/2089 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 as regards EU Climate Transition Benchmarks, EU Paris-aligned Benchmarks and sustainability-related disclosures for benchmarks (PE/90/2019/REV/1). Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/2089/oj (Accessed on April 18, 2022).

Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 Text with EEA relevance. Available at: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/575/oj (Accessed on April 18, 2022).

A sector-based classification approach

Figure 1. European banks’ exposure towards climate-policy-relevant sectors.

Notes: Own elaboration based on the classification of climate-policy-relevant sectors (CPRS) proposed by Battiston et al. (2017)^[1]Battiston, S., Mandel, A., Monasterolo, Schütze, F and Visentin, G. (2017). A climate stress-test of the financial system. Nature Climate Change 7: 283-288. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3255 applied to EU banks’ exposures provided by EBA. The CPRS consists of 8 categories, with different incidence in each sector: 1. Fossil fuel, 2. Utility, 3. Energy-intensive, 4. Buildings, 5. Transportation, 6. Agriculture, 7. Finance and 8. Others. Exposures to categories 1 to 6 are defined as those that may be affected by climate transition risks. The total value of expositions is of 2,346.53 billion of euros.

 

 

 

Figure 2: European banks’ exposure towards climate-policy-relevant sectors by category of climate transition risk.

Notes: Based on the classification of climate-policy-relevant sectors (CPRS) proposed by Battiston et al. (2017)^[2]Battiston, S., Mandel, A., Monasterolo, Schütze, F and Visentin, G. (2017). A climate stress-test of the financial system. Nature Climate Change 7: 283-288. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3255 applied to EU banks’ exposures provided by EBA. The CPRS consists of 8 categories, with different incidence in each sector: 1. Fossil fuel, 2. Utility, 3. Energy-intensive, 4. Buildings, 5. Transportation, 6. Agriculture, 7. Finance and 8. Others. Exposures to categories 1 to 6 are defined as those that may be affected by climate transition risks. The total value of expositions is of 2,346.53 billion of euros.

 

 

 

A greenhouse gas (GHG) emission-based classification approach

Figure 3: European banks’ exposure according to greenhouse gas emission intensity

Notes: Based on EBA. Greenhouse emission intensity buckets applied to EU banks’ exposures provided by EBA. Buckets are defined based on percentiles of the distribution of greenhouse gas, produced by Trucost (S&P Global) https://www.trucost.com (see the table below). The total value of expositions is of 2,346.53 billion of euros.

 

 

 

Figure 4: European banks’ exposure according to greenhouse gas emission intensity and sector.

Notes: Based on EBA.

 

 

 

A scenario analysis

Figure 5: GDP evolution under different climate scenarios.

Notes: Based on the EBA. The two scenarios represent the difference with respect to orderly transition, and they are built using the parameters sourced from the new ECB climate risk stress test framework, which includes the impact of both the transition and physical risks. The ‘disorderly’ scenario is associated with relatively high costs from a delayed/ineffective transition, and the ‘hot house world’ scenario is when no polices are implemented and natural catastrophes might occur.

 

 

 

Figure 6: Changes in firm-level probability of default with respect to the orderly transition scenario (2020 to 2050).

Notes: Based on EBA. Full bars represent the average increase in the probability of default across firms; dotted bars the increase for firms that are more vulnerable to physical risk. The two scenarios represent the difference with respect to orderly transition, and they are built using the parameters sourced from the new ECB climate risk stress test framework, which includes the impact of both the transition and physical risks. The ‘disorderly’ scenario is associated with relatively high costs from a delayed/ineffective transition, and the ‘hot house world’ scenario is when no polices are implemented and natural catastrophes might occur.

 

 

 

Figure 7: Green asset ratio.

Notes: Based on the EBA. The green asset ratio is constructed for each bank by dividing the green exposure – available only for a subset of exposures – by the total original exposure. The green amount is constructed using either bank’s self-reported data or TAC estimates.

Authors

José Manuel Mansilla-Fernández^[1]Public University of Navarre and Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics (INARBE).

 

Incidence of the Covid-19 in Europe

Figure 1: The Covid-19 pandemic exploded in Europe in March 2020; a second wave started in Fall, with more heterogeneous effects across countries. Lockdowns and social distancing measures had a strong negative impact on the economy.

Source: Own elaboration based on data from Refinitiv Eikon. Data are presented as a 5-day moving average to smooth variations in recording daily deaths.  

 

Figure 2: The Great lockdown in Europe (2020Q1 and 2002Q2) diminished production substantially, although economic recovery began in the second half of the year (2020Q3 and 2020Q4).  

Figure 2: The Great lockdown in Europe (2020Q1 and 2002Q2) diminished production substantially, although economic recovery began in the second half of the year (2020Q3 and 2020Q4).  

 

The impact of the Covid-19 crisis on the banking sector

Figure 3: Investors perceived banks as comparatively safer institutions during the Covid-19 crisis than during the sovereign debt crisis. The European Central Bank’s pandemic programmes supported more favourable financing conditions. 

Source: Own elaboration based on data from Refinitiv Eikon. The lines represent the daily difference between 5-year Banks’ CDS and 10-year Sovereign Bonds CDS.  

 

Figure 4. European banks slightly improved their capitalization during the Covid-19 crisis.  

Source: Own elaboration based on ECB data. The Tier 1 capital ratio is defined as the proportion of tier 1 capital – equity capital and disclosed reserves – to total risk-weighted assets.Interruzione pagina 

 

Figure 5. The dispersion of Tier 1 capital across banks increased during the Covid-19 crisis, and more in some countries than in others. 

Source: Own elaboration based on the EBA database. The Tier 1 capital ratio is defined as the proportion of tier 1 capital – equity capital and disclosed reserves – to total risk-weighted assets. The whiskers represent the maximum and the minimum of the distribution. The box is divided into two parts by the median. The upper (lower) box represents the 25 percent of the sample greater (lower) than the median up to the third quartile and down to the first quartile). The mean of the distribution is represented by ×. 

 

Figure 6. Banks slightly increased the share of domestic sovereign bonds held in their balance sheets, the more so in periphery countries.

Source: ECB. Ratio of the holdings of domestic sovereign debt and total assets by MFIs in each country. Core countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands; periphery countries are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (see the Numbers note in the European Economy 2016.1 issue). 

 

Figure 7: Bank lending increased on average in the Euro zone, but at different rates across countries. 

Source: Own elaboration based on ECB data. Figures are year-on-year percentage changes of the stock of banks loans.  

 

Figure 8. The ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to total loans reduced slightly during the pandemic. 

Source: Own elaboration based on ECB data. This ratio is calculated as the volume of impaired loans to total loans by country.

 

Figure 9. The share of loans under forbearance, and its evolution during the pandemic, are heterogeneous across European countries.  

Source: EBA Risk Dashboard. The forbearance ratio is calculated as exposures with forbearance measures to total gross loans and advances. Forbearance denotes a situation where a lending contract or other bilateral credit relationship has become problematic (in the sense of unexpectedly deviating from contractual cash flows due to the actions of one counterparty) leading to lender granting concessions or modifications that it would otherwise not consider.

 

Moratoria and Public Credit Guarantee Schemes (PGS)

Figure 10. In some European countries, contingent liabilities related to the government guarantees offered on bank loans are a relevant share of new loans. 

Source: EBA supervisory reporting.  

 

Figure 11. Loans under moratoria is comparatively higher in the so-called periphery countries than in core countries.  

Source: EBA supervisory reporting.  

 

Figure 12. The share of loans under moratoria which are classified as Stage 2 is heterogeneous across European countries, and it is higher than the average share of loans classified as Stage 2 in the country.  

Source: EBA supervisory reporting; data refer to 2020Q2. According to the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9, a loan should be classified as stage 2 when its credit risk has increase significantly, and the payment past due by 30 days (underperforming). Countries included in the sample are: Austria (AT), Belgium (BG), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Croatia (HR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Iceland (IS), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Latvia (LV), Malta (MT), The Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SI), and Slovakia (SK). 

 

Figure 13. European banks increased their holdings of cash and central bank reserves, partly as a result of central bank funding. 

Source: EBA supervisory reporting.

 

Figure 14: Bank deposits increased in all European countries.  

Source: Own elaboration based on ECB data.  

 

Figure 15. Bank profitability generally decreased in all major European countries during the Covid-19 pandemic crisis.

Source: Own elaboration based on ECB data. The return on equity ratio is calculates as the annualized operating profits before taxes over total equity and represents banks’ profitability. Data are adjusted for seasonality.   

 

Stylised facts on moratoria and public guarantee schemes (PGS)

Figure 16. NPL ratios are larger for countries with higher level of loans subject to moratoria.  

Source: Own elaboration based on the EBA database; data refer to 2020Q4. NPL ratio is calculated as the value of amount of non-performing loans to that of total loans. Countries included in the sample are: Austria (AT), Belgium (BG), Bulgaria (BG), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Croatia (HR), Ireland (IE), Iceland (IS), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Latvia (LV), Malta (MT), The Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SI), and Slovakia (SK). 

 

Figure 17. Debt-to-GDP ratios are higher in countries with a larger share of loans subject to moratoria.  

Source: Own elaboration based on the EBA database; data refer to 2020Q4. Countries included in the sample are: Austria (AT), Belgium (BG), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Croatia (HR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Iceland (IS), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Latvia (LV), Malta (MT), The Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SI), and Slovakia (SK).  

 

Figure 18. The Tier 1 capital ratio is found to be lower in countries with higher level of loans subject to moratoria.  

Source: Own elaboration based on the EBA database; data refer to 2020Q4. Countries included in the sample are: Austria (AT), Belgium (BG), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Croatia (HR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Iceland (IS), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Latvia (LV), Malta (MT), The Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SI), and Slovakia (SK).  

 

Figure 19. Higher loans with moratoria ratios are associated with lower returns on equity (ROE).  

Source: Own elaboration based on the EBA database; data refer to 2020Q4. ROE is the return on equity ratio, which is calculated as operating profits over equity. Countries included in the sample are: Austria (AT), Belgium (BG), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Croatia (HR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Iceland (IS), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Latvia (LV), Malta (MT), The Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SI), and Slovakia (SK).  

 

Figure 20. The higher the Tier 1 ratio, the lower new loans under public guarantee schemes (PGS).  

Source: Own elaboration based on the EBA database; data refer to 2020Q2. The vertical axis represents newly originated loans under PGS.  The Tier 1 capital ratio is defined as the proportion of tier 1 capital -equity capital and disclosed reserves- to total risk-weighted assets. Countries included in the whole sample are: Austria (AT), Belgium (BG), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Croatia (HR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Iceland (IS), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Latvia (LV), Malta (MT), The Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SI), and Slovakia (SK).  

 

Figure 21. The higher the Tier 1 ratio, the lower the non-performing loans (NPLs) ratio.   

Source: Own elaboration based on the EBA 2020 EU-wide transparency exercise data, which refer to 2020Q2. The horizontal axis represents the Tier 1 capital ratio, which is defined as the proportion of tier 1 capital -equity capital and disclosed reserves- to total risk-weighted assets. The vertical axis shows the non-performing loans (NPLs) ratio, which is calculated as impaired loans over total loans. The slope of the regression is statistically significant (p-value < 0.011). The sample includes individual observations of banks from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  

This section of the journal indicates some and briefly commented references that a non-expert reader may want to cover to obtain a first informed and broad view of the theme discussed in the current issue. These references are meant to provide an extensive, though not exhaustive, insight into the main issues of the debate. More detailed and specific references are available in each article published in the current issue. 

 

On the economic impact of epidemics and pandemics

The current Covid-19 pandemic has vividly shown that public health issues can significantly impact the financial system due to its enormous economic costs. Notably, related containment and social distancing measures are likely to shatter the productive sector, households’ behaviour, and financial institutions’ performance through various transmission channels (Angelini et al., 2020).

Before the Covid-19 outbreak, we may find previous research warning us to anticipate the economic costs of possible future epidemics and pandemics. Accurately, Bloom et al. (2018) discuss the economic concerns that are now at the forefront after the Covid-19 outbreak, specifically increasing costs to the health system, medical treatment of infected patients and outbreak control, loss to employee productivity, or the impact on tourism, social distancing measures which may well disrupt economic activity, and impact on foreign direct investment. Interestingly, Fan et al. (2018) estimate that pandemic risks cost approximately 0.6% of global income per year. Nevertheless, the cost of the Covid-19 crisis exceeded this threshold at the time of writing this note (Goodell, 2020).^[1]Goodell (2020) describes the repercussions of past pandemics such as the impact of the HIV/AIDS outbreak or the cost of future pandemics. Likewise, Haacker (2004) shows that the capacity of … Continue reading

The current literature endeavoring to forecast the Covid-19 dynamics is built on Kermack and McKendrick’s (1927) seminal work. In particular, Eichenbaum et al. (2020) investigate the equilibrium interactions between economic decisions and epidemics based on Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. Interestingly, Eichenbaum et al. find that, although reducing consumption and work mitigates the severity of the epidemic, the magnitude of the recession might be accentuated. In other words, the competitive equilibrium is not socially Pareto efficient as the infected group do not completely internalize the effects of their decisions about consumption and work. Their benchmark model predicts that the optimal containment policy tightens the severity of the recession but saving roughly half a million lives. Similarly, Chronopoulos et al. (2020) analyses consumer spending response to the onset and spread of the virus^[2]The SARS-CoV-2 virus is the agent that causes the coronavirus disease, namely COVID-19. and the subsequent lockdown imposed in Great Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales). They find that consumers remained relatively stable during the initial phases of the Covid-19 crisis. Then, discretionary spending declined as consumers anticipated the lockdown and continued to do so after being announced. Lastly, a temporary decline in consumer spending was registered in Great Britain after the ‘stay alert’ announcement.

Importantly, it should be noted that previous authors who demonstrate that contagious disease outbreaks were contained to a lesser level than their potentiality (Bloom and Canning, 2004; Lewis, 2004; Madhav et al., 2017; Tam et al., 2016, Yach et al., 2006). Accurately, Thomas (2018) describes that the lethal outbreak of the respiratory disease Nipah in India created a significant global health issue.^[3]The World Health Organization lists contagion diseases outbreaks from 1996, including Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS), Zika, Ebola virus disease, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome … Continue reading Interestingly, the World Health Organization (2020) report warned that the world was insufficiently prepared to take on the Covid-19 pandemic, particularly global collective actions, coordination and engagement with global systems, and financing.

 

On the impact of Covid-19 on the banking sector

The foremost financial literature shows that deteriorations in public health conditions might induce aggregate risks, thus subsequently impacting financial development and the banking sector’s stability. Undoubtedly, banks are vulnerable to aggregate risk, which might increase the likelihood of accumulating non-performing loans, and bank runs. In this regard, Lagoarde-Segot and Leoni (2013) carry out a theoretical model that shows that the banking industry of a developing country is relatively more likely to fail as the prevalence of large epidemics increases. Indeed, most of microfinance institutions and banks’ lending to the poor will be pressured by the aggregate risk (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986; Skoufias, 2003). Particularly, Leoni (2013) finds that the spread of HIV in developing countries is associated with large deposit withdrawals attributed to patients’ need to pay for individual treatments.

Nowadays, economists are concerned about the impact of the Covid-19 crisis on financing points out firms’ need for liquidity and the capacity of banks to meet liquidity demand. In the first weeks of March 2020, non-financial businesses drew funds from banks’ credit lines, anticipating possible disruptions to cash flow and taking on deteriorations in funding conditions. Consequently, commercial and industrial (C&I hereafter) credit exploded on banks’ balance sheets. Indeed, the three first weeks of March 2020 were an unprecedented stress test on banks’ capacity to supply liquidity. Li et al. (2020) show that both bank and market characteristics explain the growth mentioned above of lending. Interestingly, large banks experienced relatively greater drawdowns than smaller ones. Besides, drawdowns came mainly from larger firms, which typically borrow from large banks (see Prior, 2020; Prior et al., 2020). Consequently, the largest banks granted C&I credit relatively faster than other banks.

One might raise the question of whether banks’ ability to meet the unforeseen increase in liquidity demand depends on their pre-shock financial conditions. Earlier research suggests that combining deposits and off-balance sheet credit commitments creates diversification synergies that might allow banks to hold less cash (Kashyap et al., 2002). Gatev and Strahan (2006) find that synergies are beneficial during periods of market stress because deposits flow into banks while borrowers’ liquidity demands peak.^[4]Although Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find consistent results, Acharya and Mora (2015) highlight that banks pay higher rates to attract deposits.

Remarkably, previous studies analysing liquidity distress following the 2008 Financial Crisis converge on certain similarities with the Covid-19 crisis, which draws a stimulating theoretical framework for future research. In this regard, Cornett et al. (2011) study a related show that banks adjust to shocks to liquidity demands by reding new credit origination, and changes in credit supply depend on banks’ access to financial resources. Accurately, banks more reliant on core deposits, holding more liquid assets, and better capitalized are more prone to increase lending –and reduce less their credit supply-. Consistently, Ippolito et al. (2016) find that banks relatively more exposed to wholesale funds experienced more significant credit-line drawdowns during the European sovereign debt crisis. In addition, Li et al. (2020) find that, during the Covid-19 crisis, aggregate deposits inflows were enough to fund the increase in liquidity demand, explaining why the size of banks’ pre-crisis deposit base was independent of lending across banks. Interestingly, their results suggest that liquidity movements from off balance-sheet onto bank balance sheets will automatically increase risk-weighting assets, thus moving closer the regulatory minimum capital ratios. Furthermore, increases in loan loss provisions due to expansionary credit and risks going forward, are bound to reduce capital ratios.

Consequently, shortage of capital might constrain credit supply unless banks reduce capital distributions -i.e. dividends– and/or raise new equity. In this regard, Blank et al. (2020) conduct simulations for the future path of bank capital following the Covid-19 crisis. Their results suggest that significant declines in capital ratios could severely limit future credit supply.

Significantly, literature is growing towards the effects of debt and liquidity on non-financial firms following the Covid-19 outbreak. In this regard, O’Hara and Zhou (2020) find that the bond-market liquidity collapsed in early March but recovered after the Federal Reserve announced its intention to intervene. Fahlenbrach et al. (2020) show that a firm with more financial flexibility performs comparatively better. De Vito and Gómez (2020) find that firms would deplete their cash holdings in an interval of two years, consistent with non-financial firms relying upon bank liquidity. Importantly, Acharya and Steffen (2020a,b) document that the access to bank credit lines during the Covid-19 crisis was helpful for non-financial firms, based on stock return analysis. Acharya and Steffen (2020a,b) investigate the role of access to liquidity financing from the borrower (demand-side) perspective, whereas Li et al. (2020) do it from the bank (supply-side) view.

 

On the impact of the Covid-19 on financial markets

Little is known about how financial markets react following epidemics outbreaks, setting aside pandemics.^[5]So far, investors are found to respond to other natural disasters such as volcanos, earthquakes, or terrorist acts (Bosch et al., 1998). Nevertheless, the Covid-19 outbreak has impacted … Continue reading The spillover associated with other previous natural disasters provides valuable insight into the impact of the Covid-19 on the financial markets. Previous authors examining the impact of terrorist events on financial markets might provide a parallel view since they create a widespread impact on the public mood. In particular, the analysis of the ‘spillover effects’ of terrorist events suggests abroad-based or ‘systematic’ contribution to overall risk (Karolyi, 2006). Although this evidence is limited, he has conducted few tests which assess volatility or beta risks with asset-pricing models. Previous authors show that the September 11 events affected shifts in market betas (Choudhry, 2005) and increase correlation among global markets (Chesney et al., 2011; Corbet et al., 2018; Hon et al., 2004; Nikkinen and Vähämaa, 2010).

As discussed above, the Covid-19 crisis has been found to deleteriously impact domestic demands. Thus, financial markets neglect to price the potentiality of tail-risk events that would not be survivable anyway. Consequently, a long-term impact on firm financing and the costs of capital is expected. Firms located in relatively more disaster-prone areas are shown to be less levered (Elnahas et al., 2018). In line with the trade-off theory of capital structure, firms being impacted in disastrous areas increased their costs of capital and tightened financial flexibility (Huang et al., 2018).

Recent empirical papers investigate the stock market reactions to the pandemic, finding a strong response of equity prices to news about the virus and increases in market volatility (Acharya et al., 2020; Alfaro et al. 2020; Baker et al. 2020; Caballero and Simsek, 2020). Some studies compare how different types of stocks react to the pandemic. Ding et al. (2020) show that firms more exposed to the global supply chain fared worse, whereas Ramelli and Wagner (2020) find that exposure to international trade is related to poor stock performance.

 

On the impact of Covid-19 on FinTech companies

The pandemic contributed to developing alternative forms of financial intermediation. The Financial Technologies (FinTech hereafter) has increased in different credit and other financial services by both unregulated non-banking firms and regulated banks (Erel and Liebersohn, 2020).^[6]Scarce access to traditional bank credit is one of the main reasons for borrowers to approach FinTech loans (Butler et al., 2016; Cole et al., 2019; Galema, 2020). Interestingly, FinTech companies … Continue reading Stulz (2019) discusses two well-acknowledged FinTech companies, LendingClub and Kabbage, making traditional small-business lending through a bank subsidiary or a funding bank. Remarkably, FinTech companies have been found to compete aggressively on the funding side of financial institutions’ balance sheets (Abrams, 2019).

A thought-provoking research question that can be raised is whether FinTech companies responded differently to the Covid-19 crisis than traditional banks. Furthermore, FinTech is experiencing a growing path within the financial sector, which might induce changes in the supply of financial services due to this expansion. Erel and Liebersohn (2020) study the response of FinTech to financial services demand created after the implementation of the Paycheck Protection Programme (PPP) in the United States. The role of FinTech in PPP provision is comparatively more relevant in locations where the economic effects of Covid-19 were more severe. They show that borrowers were more likely to obtain a FinTech-enabled PPP loan where local banks could not originate it. Likewise, Cororaton and Rosen (2020), for a sample of firms using the PPP, document that only 13% of eligible firms end up participating. Using preliminary data, Granja et al. (2020) investigate whether areas more affected by the pandemic, measured as declined hours worked or business shutdowns, and get more allocations.

To sum up, the interaction and competition of FinTech companies and traditional banks during the Covid-19 pandemics is a fertile field for the ongoing research agenda.

 

References

Abrams, E. (2019). Assessing bank deposit market power given limited consumer consideration. University of Chicago Working Paper. Available at: https://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/2233

Acharya, V. V., Engle, R., and Steffen, S. (2020). What explains the crash of bank stock prices during Covid-19? The role of health, financial and oil price risks. Working Paper, New York University. Available at: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/vacharya/public_html/pdfs/corporate_dash.pdf

Acharya, V. V., and Mora, N. (2015). A crisis of banks as liquidity providers. Journal of Finance, 70, 1-43.

Acharya, V. V., and Steffen, S. (2020a). ‘Stress tests’ for banks as liquidity insurers in a time of Covid. Working Paper, New York University.

Acharya, V. V., and Steffen, S. (2020b). The risk of being a fallen angel and the corporate dash for cash in the midst of Covid. Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 9, 430-471.

Alfaro, L., Chari, A., Greenland, A.N., and Schott, P.K. (2020). Aggregate and firm-level stock returns during pandemics, in real time. Working Paper, Harvard Business School. Available at: https://www.nber.org/papers/w26950

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Basel Committee’s response to the Covid-19 crisis

The outbreak of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic has tragically familiarized us with enormous costs in lives since the beginning of 2020. At the time of writing this article, Europe sees the third wave of infections. Recent research forecasts that the lockdowns in many European countries and containment measures could be fuelling an economic depression that might impact the real and the financial sectors (Angelini et al., 2020; Atkenson, 2020; Bodenstein et al., 2020). Consequently, the authorities have developed responses to support economic activity, preserve financial stability, and ensure transparency (Borio and Restoy, 2020).1

The Basel Committee regularly revises the implications of the Basel III standards for banks. Although the last published results do not reflect the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on banks, recent estimates predict that banks have made positive progress in meeting capital and liquidity requirements in the last five years. Indeed, the volume of CET^[1]Appendix A summarizes the government measures aimed at supporting the real sector in the foremost European economies, whereas Appendix B focusses on bank-specific measures. capital held by the largest banks doubled since 2011, whereas pool high liquid assets and inflows increased to near 12% since 2012 (EBA, 2020c). Consequently, banks entered the Covid-19 crisis in a relatively good position compared to the 2008 Great Financial crisis (BIS, 2020c, Enria, 2021). Notably, the Committee is evaluating the Basel III reforms that have been implemented to date. In September 2020, the Committee approved an updated work plan to evaluate the post-crisis reforms, incorporating lessons learned from the Covid-19 crisis. This analysis is to evaluate: (i) the effectiveness of the post-crisis reforms; (ii) the interactions between Basel III and other reforms; and (iii) the existence of gaps in the regulatory framework.

Notably, the outbreak of the Covid-19 crisis induced capital and liquidity measures to support banks’ lending and liquidity to the real sector. Most of these focus on the flexibility embedded in the Basel Framework while other measures remain temporary in nature. The revised Basel III standards were to take effect on the 1st January 2022.^[2]The regulatory instrument best suited to supporting the supply of credit during a downturn is the Basel III countercyclical capital buffer, which was designed to induce banks to accumulate capital … Continue reading Nevertheless, in March 2020, the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS) launched a swathe of actions to provide additional capacity for banks and supervisors to respond to the immediate financial stability concerns. These actions comprise: (i) the deferral of the Basel III standards to 1st January 2023 so as not to disrupt the business cycle even more. The accompanying transition agreements for the output floor have been postponed to 1st January 2028; (ii) The revised market risk framework to the 1st January 2023; and (iii) The revised Pillar 3 disclosure to 1st January 2023 (Svoronos and Vrbaski, 2020). However, the deadline might be extended until 2028 since, nowadays, there is not a common legislative proposal from the European Commission, and the legislatives processes might take on between two and a half and four and a half years. In this regard, Enria (2021) advocates that further delays might stoke uncertainty and postpone necessary adjustments in the banking sector.

Importantly, unlike previous reforms, the current package is not aimed at fitting all the banks equally. The impact of reform would depend on banks’ business models, size and reliance on their internal models. As a structural reform, delaying or watering down Basel III standards in Europe might create assymetries among banks and put at risk reliance on internal models (Enria 2021). In particular, European regulators should avoid unclear criteria for capital standards or double-accounting of model risk at the bank level because it might introduce confusion and uncertainty for market participants.

Importantly, many jurisdictions announced that banks’ liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) may fall below 100% and that banks may take additional time to restore their LCR. This measure is oriented to provide banks flexibility to meet their liquidity needs and support their business activities. Additionally, the publication of Pillar 3 reports was deferred to extend deadlines provided to banks to file their financial statements (BIS, 2020a,b; FSB, 2020).

 

Enhancing the flexibility of the IFRS-9 accounting standards

Accounting standards are aimed at providing for an accurate representation of the banks’ accounting situation. Simultaneously, prudential regulation is devoted to ensuring financial stability. Both objectives might not be consistently achievable. Indeed, accounting standards relying heavily on market valuations might induce excessive procyclicality in the financial system (Borio, 2019; FSF, 2009) and reinforce liquidity-price spirals (Borio, 2020a,b). In this context, the Covid-19 outbreak intensified the debate about the repercussions of prudential regulation indicators, which rely on accounting valuations and may encourage banks to behave procyclically. However, prudential authorities can partly offset procyclicality through backstops or filters (Borio, 2019; Restoy and Zamil, 2017). Arguably, backstops might be able to transparently reconcile prudential regulation and accounting (Restoy, 2010).

The two principal accounting codes, the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS 9) and the US Generally Accounting Principles (US GAAP), have recently adopted a more forward-looking approach focused on expected losses due to loan loss provisioning. Both codes entered into force in January 2018 and December 2019, respectively. However, these new schemes cannot perform their functions in unexpected shocks such as the Covid-19 pandemic since, by definition, provisions are expected losses. The regulatory authorities responded by including at least one of the following initiatives. First, banks will be allowed to suspend the application of the new standards momentarily. Second, improving the current arrangements to sterilize the impact on regulatory capital and, lastly, issuing practical implementation guidance to avoid excessively rigid interpretations could foster provisions (Borio and Restoy, 2020).

The Basel Committee highlights the importance of the expected credit loss (ECL) accounting frameworks as a forward-looking measure of credit losses. Furthermore, the Committee has consulted international accounting and auditing standard-setting boards, audit firms, and market regulators regarding the impact of Covid-19 on such frameworks. The Committee concluded that ECL frameworks are not designed to be applied mechanistically. Banks are expected to use the flexibility inherent to accounting frameworks to mitigate the impact of the Covid-19 crisis (BIS, 2020a). In the European context, banks will have to use their judgment when determining if ECLs are required. In this regard, banks are not expected to apply the ECLs approach automatically in an exceptional situation such as the Covid-19 crisis (EC, 2020a).

 

Public Guaranteed Schemes

Public guaranteed schemes (PGS hereafter) transfer, totally or partially, the risk of default from the lender to the State. They are commonly implemented in countries where market failures prevent firms from accessing bank credit. This measure has been essential to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) since the Covid-19 outbreak until the time being.^[3]Approximately 40 countries launched this programme which was aimed at providing liquidity to SMEs. The total volume of lending under PGS varies across countries (see the Numbers section). In jurisdictions where PGSs were in place before the Covid-19 crisis, countries had to make legal changes to adapt these schemes to the specific needs related to the pandemic, e.g., Spain. However, most jurisdictions decreed primary laws so as to amend the current PGS framework or to create new schemes, and to authorise fiscal backstops for the scheme. Countries with secondary legislation (e.g., the Netherlands) authorized a fiscal backstop in primary legislation. Significantly, these legal avenues depend on the country’s characteristics, and legal frameworks should be aligned with public financial management (Emre et al., 2020).

Outstandingly, moratoria and PGS share two common points. First, they are decided by governments or lawmakers, not by regulatory authorities. Second, both are complementary tools but can have very different effects in terms of borrowers’ incentives. Although the moratoria are intended to support borrowers’ short-term repayments, they can undermine credit discipline. Therefore, PGS is meant to ease capital pressures by reducing risk-weighted assets. They should also protect banks against credit risk and incentivize further lending or loan restructuring. In other words, government guarantees can be a valuable tool in the face of a sizeable exogenous shock but might also give rise to moral hazard. They might impact recovery if scarce resources end up in firms that might not be ultimately viable or do not need support. Shielding banks from bearing the risk of their lending could lead to granting credit to over-indebted borrowers (Borio and Restoy, 2020).

 

Restrictions on dividend payments and share buybacks

The restrictions on dividend payments in Europe were imposed by Recommendation ECB/2020/19 of 27 March 2020, which recommended that significant credit institutions avoid distributing dividends or share repurchases to remunerate shareholders during the Covid-19 economic crisis. Subsequently, Recommendation 2020/7 of 27 May 2020 of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) extended such restriction on dividend payments to the whole financial system. Recommendation ECB/2020/19 was subsequently repealed and extended to 1 January 2021 by Recommendation ECB/2020/35 of 27 July 2020. Then, on 15 December 2020, due to persisting uncertainty regarding the evolution of the pandemic, the ECB considered banks needed to extend restrictions on dividend payments or repurchasing shares, at least for amounts up to 15% of their accumulated profits in 2019 and 2020, or more than 20 basis points of their Common Equity Tier 1 ratio. Reflecting this, Recommendation ECB/2020/62 repealed the previous Recommendation and extended the restrictions on dividend payments to 30 September 2021 (Martinez-Miera and Vegas, 2021).

Restrictions on dividend distributions preserve capital that can be used to absorb losses and support lending, but it might impair investors’ confidence, increasing banks’ cost of capital and making equity access more costly (Kongsamut et al., 2021). Preserving capital across the whole banking sector is aligned with previous measures undertaken to stabilize the economy. Furthermore, bank supervisors have fully exercised flexibility by encouraging banks to restructure loan repayments, easing regulatory regimes, and allowing banks to draw down their buffers (Awad et al., 2021). Importantly, any bailout after being allowed to pay dividends would be controversial, although they might be necessary in specific cases.

 

Contingency plans and bank resolution in the context of the Covid-19 crisis

As the pandemic’s impact across social and industry sectors has been intense, one should expect that some loans might not be repaid and NPLs increase in the most impacted cohorts, even in a recovery scenario. Consequently, banks exposed to weak borrowers might cast some doubts about their viability even under the most optimistic scenarios. If problems in the financial sector persist, creditors and investors may no longer distinguish between viable and unviable financial institutions, thus undermining confidence in the whole sector and triggering liquidity problems.

Past crises teach us that financial systems might be more resilient with a well-developed safety net and good planning. Regulatory authorities should be aware that actions oriented to strengthen safety nets -e.g., central banks, financial supervisory and regulatory agencies, resolution authority, deposit insurers, and Ministry of Finance- must have clear mandates and enough operational independence to be able to operate and execute their task under pressure.

Notably, bank resolution might be assumed undesirable and unpracticable during a health crisis. Indeed, regulatory authorities are encouraged to enhance their resolution plans for contingencies, which should be aimed at responding to potential systemic crises and in anticipation of a return to normalcy. Given the unprecedented nature of the Covid-19 outbreak, accelerating too rapid recognition of banks’ losses might constrain their ability to absorb the shock. As in the previous crisis, assessing the viability of individual banks is a crucial task, but it can only be credible when the lasting and the scope of the pandemic were clarified. Bank resolution and restructuring options can be identified once the size and distribution of losses have been quantified. Furthermore, capital needs might differ significantly across banks depending on business models and risk appetites and incentives to hide problems and losses, which might deleteriously reduce profitability and capital.

 

Legislative proposals in Europe: the moratoria and the classification of NPLs

European Banking Association (EBA) Guidelines on legislative and non-legislative loan repayment moratoria were published on 2nd April 2020 to ensure that banks would grant payment holidays to customers to avoid the automatic classification of exposures under the definition of forbearance or defaulted under distressed restructuring. After the second Covid-19, the EBA decided to reactivate the Guidelines on the 2nd of December to guarantee that loans, which have not been benefited from the moratoria, can now do it. However, the EBA has introduced the following two limitations to ensure that the support provided by the moratoria is limited to bridging liquidity shortages triggered by containment measures without operational restraints on the continuous supply of credit. First, only loans that are suspended, postponed or reduced under general payment moratoria not more than 9 months in total, including previously granted payment holidays, can benefit from applying the Guidelines. Second, banks are requested to document to their supervisors how they will assess that the exposures to general payment moratoria do not become NPLs. This requirement will allow supervisors to take appropriate actions if necessary (EBA, 2020a,b).

The legacy of the past financial crisis has been a high stock of NPLs in Member States banks. However, it should be emphasized that important progresses have been made to reduce their weight in banks’ balance sheets and improve their operational efficiency. Indeed, government guarantees and payment moratoria are key measures to support borrowers’ who might be significantly affected by the pandemic. From the regulatory point of view, the definition of default and loan forbearance under the Capital Requirement Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 575/2013) may stand in the way of widespread use of these measures. The Communication (COM/2020/112 final) clarifies that the prudential regulation rules on the classification of NPLs can accommodate in line with the ECB’s rules (EC, 2020a).

Importantly, exit strategies should be cognizant of other non-regulatory support measures to avoid compound cliff effects. Then, coordination between national and supranational authorities will be vital. Importantly exit strategies should be multifaced and adapted to country-specific characteristics to address solvency issues and distinguishing among impaired assets. There is no one-fits-all strategy to bank restructuring or NPLs resolution, and domestic regulators are encouraged to diagnose detailly before recommending systemic solutions such as public management companies, which are not suitable for heterogenous credits. Furthermore, exit strategies should include intertemporal trade-offs between increasing credit provision in the short term and maintaining long-term resilience given the associated risks (Kongsamut, 2021).

 

The ECB’s monetary policy decisions

The scale and the nature of the Covid-19 crisis called for an extraordinary monetary policy response. The European Central Bank introduced a wide-ranging package of measures that acted through two dimensions: (i) asset purchases and (ii) liquidity operations. Regarding asset purchases, an extra 120 billion euros was added to the ongoing Asset Purchase Programme (APP) on the 12th March 2020. Subsequently, the third Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO III) programme became one of the main liquidity provisions (Borgioli et al., 2020). Borrowing rates can be as low as 50 basic points below the average interest rates on the deposit facility between 21st June 2020 and 23rd June 2021, and as low as the average rate on the deposit facility during the rest of the life of the respective TLTRO III. Accurately, the Decision ECB/2020/25 and Decision (EU) 2020/614 modify the lending performance threshold, a new lending assessment period and changes in the interest rate to be applied to TLTRO III; whereas the Decision ECB/2020/13 modifies the borrowing allowance and the bid limits per operation to be applied to TLTRO III and allows an earlier repayment option after one year of settlement starting in September 2021 (Altavilla et al., 2020).

The Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) was launched on 18th March 2020 and is conceived as a temporary asset purchase programme of private and public sector securities. The cornerstone of this programme is that the national central banks will flexibly conduct purchases of public debt. The Government Council will offer four additional pandemic emergency longer-term refinancing operations (PELTROs) in 2021, which will continue to provide an effective liquidity backstop.

 

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Borio, C. (2019). New loan provisioning standards and procyclicality. Financial Stability Review, Bank of Spain, Spring 2019. Also available in BIS Speeches: https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp181024.htm (Accessed on April 29, 2021).

Borio, C., and Restoy, F. (2020). Reflections on regulatory responses to the Covid-19 pandemic. FSI Briefs No 1. Available at: https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsibriefs1.htm (Accessed on April 29, 2021).

Emre, E., Gullo, A., Müller, C., Pineda, M., Tamez, T., and Vasquez, K. (2020). Legal Considerations on Public Guarantees Schemes Adopted in Response to the COVID-19 Crisis. IMF Special Series on Covid-19. Legal.

Enria, A. (2021). Basel III implementation: the last mile is always the hardest. Available at: https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2021/html/ssm.sp210503~1672b8b1f0.en.html (Accessed on May 5, 2021)

European Banking Authority (EBA) (2020a). First evidence on the use of moratoria and public guarantees in the banking sector. Thematic Note EBA/Rep/2020/31.

European Banking Authority (EBA) (2020b). Guidelines on legislative and non-legislative moratoria on loan repayments applied in the light of the COVID-19 crisis. Final report. Available at: https://eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/credit-risk/guidelines-legislative-and-non-legislative-moratoria-loan-repayments-applied-light-covid-19-crisis (Accessed on April 29, 2021).

European Banking Authority (EBA) (2020c). Risk assessment of the European banking system. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Available at: https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/risk-assessment-reports (Accessed on April 29, 2021).

European Commission (EC) (2020a). Coronavirus response: Banking Package to facilitate bank lending. Supporting households and businesses in the EU. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20_757 (Accessed on April 29, 2021).

European Commission (EC) (2020b). Digital Finance Package. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/200924-digital-finance-proposals_en (Accessed on April 29, 2021).

Financial Stability Board (FSB) (2020). COVID-19 Pandemic: Financial Stability Impact and Policy Responses. Report submitted to the G20. Available at: https://www.fsb.org/2020/11/covid-19-pandemic-financial-stability-impact-and-policy-responses/ (Accessed on April 29, 2021).

Financial Stability Forum (FSF) (2009). Report of the Financial Stability Forum on addressing procyclicality in the Financial System. April. Available at: https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_0904a.pdf (Accessed on April 29, 2021).

Kongsamut, P., Monaghan, D., and Riedweg, L. (2021). Unwinding COVID-19 Policy Interventions for Banking Systems. International Monetary Fund. Special Series on COVID-19.
Martinez-Miera, D., and Vegas, R. (2021). Impact of the dividend distribution restriction on the flow of credit to non-financial corporations in Spain. Bank of Spain Analytical Articles. Available at: https://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/informes/boletines/articulos-analit/ (Accessed on April 29, 2021).

Restoy, F. (2020). Central banks and financial stability: A reflection after the Covid-19 outbreak. Financial Stability Institute Occasional Paper No 16. Bank for International Settlement. Available at: https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsipapers16.htm (Accessed on April 29, 2021).

Restoy, F. (2010). Accounting, convergence, governance and regulation. Speech at the IASC Foundation IFRS Conference, June. Available at: https://www.esma.europa.eu/document/accounting-convergence-governance-and-regulation-speech-given-fernando-restoy-ifrs (Accessed on April 29, 2021).

Restoy, F., and Zamil, R. (2017). Prudential policy considerations under expected loss provisioning: Lessons from Asia. FSI Insights on policy implementation No 5. Bank for International Settlement. Available at: https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insights5.pdf (Accessed on April 29, 2021).

Svoronos, J.P, and Vrbaski, R. (2020). Banks’ dividends in Covid-19 times. FSI Briefs No 6. Available at: https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsibriefs6.htm (Accessed on April 29, 2021).

 

Legislation cited

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Investment Bank, and the Eurogroup. Coordinated economic response to the COVID-19 Outbreak (COM/2020/112 final).

Decision (EU) 2020/614 of the European Central Bank of 30 April 2020 amending Decision (EU) 2019/1311 on a third series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (ECB/2020/25).

Decision (EU) 2020/407 of the European Central Bank of 16 March 2020 amending Decision (EU) 2019/1311 on a third series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (ECB/2020/13).

Recommendation of the European Central Bank of 27 March 2020 on dividend distributions during the COVID-19 pandemic and repealing Recommendation ECB/2020/1 (ECB/2020/19) 2020/C 102 I/01.

Recommendation of the European Central Bank of 27 July 2020 on dividend distributions during the COVID-19 pandemic and repealing Recommendation ECB/2020/19 (ECB/2020/35) 2020/C 251/01.

Recommendation of the European Central Bank of 15 December 2020 on dividend distributions during the COVID-19 pandemic and repealing Recommendation ECB/2020/35 (ECB/2020/62) 2020/C 437/01.

Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 27 May 2020 on restriction of distributions during the COVID-19 pandemic (ESRB/2020/7) 2020/C 212/01.

Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.

 

Appendix A. Summary of government measures oriented to support the real sector.

 

France

State-Guaranteed Loans	Moratorium	Liquidity Shortage
Law No. 2020-289 and ministerial order of implementation dated 23 March 2020: The State-guaranteed loan is a one-year treasury loan and will have a grace period over this period. It could support corporate bank financing to the tune of EUR 300 billion.	Ordinance n. 2020-306 dated 25 March 2020 on the extension of time limits and adaptation of procedures during the Emergency Period (as defined below) has been taken and supplemented by ordinance n. 2020-427 dated 15 April 2020.	Bpifrance and the government finance 50% of the consulting costs concerning the WCR cash module.
Credit Mediation / Lines	Public Credit
Support from the State and the Bank of France (credit mediation) to negotiate with his bank a rescheduling of bank loans. The Credit Mediation Department may accept companies in amicable procedure, in safeguard or receivership, and exceptionally in compulsory liquidation.	Amended Finance Bill for 2020, Law #2020-473, 25 April 2020: State-granted loans when they have not benefited from State-guaranteed loans. Banks will have to write reasons for refusing loans lower than EUR 50 thousand to companies.

 

Germany

State-Guaranteed Loans	Moratorium	Liquidity Shortage
The KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) offers a fast track loan for the companies with more than 10 employees. This loan is 100% secured by the German Federal Government guarantee.	The obligation to file for insolvency is suspended retroactively from 1 March 2020 until 30 September 2020 for companies which are suffering economic difficulties or have become illiquid because of the pandemic.	Joint protective shield amounting to EUR 30 billion from the Federal Government and credit insurers to secure supplier credits of German companies. Substantial participation of credit insurers, who bear losses of up to EUR 500 million.
Credit Mediation / Lines	Public Credit
Introduction of a shopping line coverage whereby the credit lines of foreign customers from various exporters are combined into credit tranches with a uniform repayment profile and counted towards the Hermes-covered credit line.	The German Federal Government has adopted a package of measures to help companies cope with the coronavirus crisis. The role of the state-owned development bank KfW in this crisis is to facilitate the short-term supply of liquidity to companies.

 

Italy

State-Guaranteed Loans	Moratorium	Liquidity Shortage
Central Guarantee Fund (“Fondo centrale di garanzia”): Less than 72 months loans of amounts equal to those set forth by the decree no. 23/2020 may be guaranteed by the Central Fund up to 90% (in case of direct guarantee) or up to 100% (in case of reinsurance), subject to the approval of the European Commission. The Central Fund and Confidi guarantee also 100% of loans (with a limit of 25% of the total turnover of the beneficiaries) granted to companies with less than EUR 3.2 million of total turnover.	The Italian Banking Association has announced an agreement with various professional associations to set up a large-scale moratorium on debt repayment, including mortgages and repayments of small loans and revolving lines of credit. It will concern loans taken out by companies until 31 January 2020.	The National Promotional Institute and the development finance institution have increased the funding limit for the banking system, from EUR 1 million to EUR 3 million.
Credit Mediation / Lines	Public Credit
SACE S.p.A. issues guarantees for loans granted to companies of any size (EUR 200 billion of which EUR 30 billion for SMEs). SACE guarantees between 90% and 70% of the granted loans’ amount; the guarantees’ amount depends on the number of companies’ employees in Italy and on the relative annual turnover (with at least 5000 employees and until EUR 1.5 billion, between EUR 1.5 billion and EUR 5 billion or greater than EUR 5 billion annual turnover).	The National Promotional Institute and the development finance institution have increased the funding limit for the banking system, from EUR 1 million to EUR 3 million.

 

The Netherlands

State-Guaranteed Loans	Moratorium	Liquidity Shortage
Enlargement of the Corporate Financing Guarantee Scheme (Garantie Ondernemersfinanciering; GO-C) for SMEs and larger firms. The amount for which the government stands as guarantor has been increased up to EUR 150 million.	Small firms are offered a six-month delay in repayments of micro loans through Qredits, with interest rates lowered down to 2%.	Borgstelling MKB-kredieten (BMKB(-C)): The credit guarantee has been increased up to 90% of 75% of a line of credit and the percentage for the premium due is lowered from 3.9% to 2% for a maximum period of 8 quarters and 3% for a period of 9 to 16 quarters. The BMKB(-C) guarantee ceiling is EUR 1.5 billion.
Credit Mediation / Lines	Public Credit
The Growth Facility Scheme, which makes it easier for SMEs to raise capital, will be extended by one year, to 1 July 2021.	SMEs with relatively small financial needs are, under conditions, eligible for a bridging loan of up to € 50,000 under the Small Credits for Corona Guarantee Scheme (Klein Krediet Corona garantieregeling; KKC) with the State as guarantor for 95% of loan. The term of the loan is at most 5 years against an interest rate of max. 4%, with a one-time premium of 2%. This measure has a guarantee ceiling of EUR 713 million.

 

Spain

 

State-Guaranteed Loans	Moratorium	Liquidity Shortage
Royal Decree-8 2020: Approval of a EUR 100,000 million line of state-backed guarantees credit line whereby the State shall cover the financing extended by financial institutions to companies and self-employed persons.	Royal Decree-8 2020: Moratoria is applied to mortgage-backed loan agreements when the debtor is in a situation of economic vulnerability, as well as the guarantors of the main debtor. Notaries’ fees for intervention in contracts formalising the temporary suspension (moratorium) of contractual obligations under any of the non-mortgage-backed loans or credits referred to in Royal Decree-Law 11/2020.	Royal Decree-Law 8/2020: Approval of a credit line whereby the State shall cover the financing extended by financial institutions to companies and self-employed persons. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Digital Transformation will grant up to EUR 100,000 million in guarantees for funding provided by credit institutions (Art. 29).
Credit Mediation / Lines	Public Credit
Royal Decree-Law 15/2020: The counter-guarantee granted by Compañía Española de Reafianzamiento Sociedad Anónima (CERSA) has been consolidated to increase the guarantee capacity of Reciprocal Guarantee Company. Provisions made to cover promissory notes included on the Spanish Brokers’ Association (AIAF) Fixed Income Market and the Alternative Fixed income Market (MARF).	Raising of the net indebtedness limit of the Spanish official credit institute (ICO) to increase credit facilities aimed at financing SMEs and the self-employed. The General State Budget Law allows ICO to raise EUR 10,000 million to provide additional liquidity to the above-mentioned agents.

 

United Kingdom

State-Guaranteed Loans	Moratorium	Liquidity Shortage
The Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS) -for business with turnover lower than GBP 45 million- UK businesses with annual turnover of no more than GBP 45m can borrow up to GBP 5m interest-free for 12 months under a British Business Bank (BBB) scheme where the Government provides the lender with a guarantee for 80% of each loan (subject to a per-lender cap on claims) and covers the cost of the first 12 months of interest. For large businesses, the CBILS involves a government guarantee of 80% to enable banks to make loans of up to GBP 25 million (CBILS was capped at GBP 5 million) to businesses with an annual turnover of between GBP 45 million and GBP 250 million. Firms with a turnover of more than GBP 250 million can borrow up to GBP 50 million from lenders. The government guarantees 80% of the finance to the lender.	Regulations will provide for application to: a) Charitable Incorporated Organisations. b) Co-operative and community benefit societies c) Limited liability partnerships Where entities currently benefit from a special administration regime (for example providers of social housing, gas and electricity supply companies and financial institutions) regulations can be made to modify application of or disapply the moratorium for those entities.	Bounce Back loan scheme for small businesses: On 27 April, the government announced a fast-track finance scheme for small businesses, allowing firms to apply for Bounce Back loans worth up to 25% of turnover, with a maximum payment of GBP 50,000, and access the cash within days. The government will provide lenders with a 100% guarantee for the loan and pay any fees and interest for the first 12 months. No repayments will be due during the first 12 months. After that the interest rate will be set at 2.5% a year.
Credit Mediation / Lines	Public Credit
The COVID-19 Corporate Finance Facility (CCFF) has been created to provide funding to large businesses through the purchase of short-term corporate debt in the form of commercial paper. The CCFF launched on 23 March 2020 and Bank of England data released on 2 April 2020 showed that GBP 1.9 billion of commercial paper has been purchased under this facility already and according to a HM Treasury release on 3 April 2020 a further GBP 1.6 billion has been committed.	Future Fund for high-growth companies: The Future Fund was initially endowed with GBP 500 million loan scheme aimed at ensuring that high-growth companies in the UK receive the investment they need to continue during the crisis. The government confirmed that given the high number of applications it would be expanding its financial commitment to the fund. Delivered in partnership with the British Business Bank.

Source: Own elaboration from KPMG’s website (https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2020/04/government-response-global-landscape.html).

 

Appendix B. Regulatory measures appliable to banks as of April 2021.

 

Country	Regulatory measures
France	Reducing the countercyclical capital buffer to 0% (an increase from 0,25% to 0,5% was to become in April 2020).
Germany	Releasing the countercyclical capital buffer for banks from 0,25% to 0%. Further EUR 100 billion to refinance expanded to refinance expanded short-term liquidity provision to companies through the public development bank (KfW) in partnership with commercial banks.
Italy	The Bank of Italy announced a series of measured to help banks and non-bank intermediaries, in line with those undertaken by the ECB and the EBA. Including the possibility to operate below selected capital and liquidity requirements, as well as rescheduling on-site inspections. Promoting the use of credit claims as collateral to incentivize lending to SMEs.
The Netherlands	The De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) reduced systemic buffer requirements for the three largest banks. The DNB is also taking measures to provide less regulatory relief to less significant banking institutions. Banks directly supervised by the DNB are allowed to exclude specific central banks exposures when calculating leverage ratios. Introducing a floor for mortgage loan risk weighting is postponed. Dutch banks agreed to grant SMEs a six-month postponement of their loan repayment. On the 6th October 2020, the authorities adopted a law to facility debt restructuring for companies facing financial difficulties. This law is intended to avoid bankruptcies.
Spain	The Bank of Spain will allow the banks under its supervision to adapt the settings of transition periods and the intermediate minimum required own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) targets. Banks will be allowed to apply expert judgement for the credit-risk classification of forborne exposures.
United Kingdom	The Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) set out expectations that banks suspended dividends and buybacks until end-2020, cancel 2019 dividends and pay no cash bonuses to senior staff. The PRA indicated all Pillar 2A requirements will be set as nominal amount despite a percentage of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA). The PRA will allow companies to offset the increase in RWA due to the application of a higher value-at-risk (VaR) multiplier through a reduction in risks-not-in-VaR (NVAR) capital requirements. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) introduced a package of targeted temporary measures to support customers affected by coronavirus, including payment freeze on loans and credit cards for up to three months.

Source: Own elaboration from the IMF Policy Tracker (URL: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#G).